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Do states with high welfare benefits attract low-income people from other states?  Using data
from the County to County Migration Flow Files from the 1980 census, I investigate this question by
reintroducing migration rates into the definition of welfare migrants and examining situations in which
a person moves from one state to a neighboring state whose welfare benefits are appreciably higher.  I
find no compelling evidence in support of the welfare magnet theory; my results are as likely to
validate as they are to refute the hypothesis.Migration among Low-Income Households:  Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus
1. INTRODUCTION
Tom Corbett's 1991 Focus article, "The Wisconsin Welfare Magnet Debate:  What Is an
Ordinary Member of the Tribe to Do When the Witch Doctors Disagree?" presents a fine overview of
recent research and policy discussions on this long-standing and emotive public policy issue.  The
notion of a welfare magnet is deceivingly simple—the interstate relocation of persons for the purpose
of securing higher welfare benefits (Corbett 1991)—and in light of the research effort directed at
measuring its force, one would expect a consensus to have emerged.  However, the issue remains far
from resolved for reasons that are not hard to understand.  The operative word in the definition of a
welfare magnet is purpose.  In-migration by low-income individuals is not sufficient to identify a
welfare magnet; instead, individuals must be drawn (and retained) with the intent of obtaining higher
welfare benefits.  With the existing data and statistical methodology, distinguishing this motive from all
the other reasons people move is impossible.  Consequently, efforts to confirm the existence of welfare
magnets have relied on low standards of proof.  The definitions of a welfare migrant used in many
studies have been too general (e.g., "any nonnative state resident receiving AFDC") to be useful; such
broad classifications capture other behaviors in addition to welfare migration.  Indeed, the standards of
evidence have been so low that it is common practice for studies to find "evidence" of welfare magnets
without using data on migration rates (e.g., Peterson and Rom [1990])!
Although I too cannot isolate any one reason why someone may have relocated, I can still test
the validity of the welfare magnet hypothesis.  In this paper I reintroduce migration rates into the
definition of welfare magnets and adopt a different perspective than has been employed in the existing
literature.  Whereas prior studies have used detailed covariates and highly aggregated geographical
regions to analyze migration behavior, I employ fine-grained geographical information and crude
covariate structures of the County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.  I examine2
short-distance moves between contiguous states; in most cases, the moves I consider are between
contiguous counties in those states.  Thus, the possibility that the people in my sample relocated in
order to be in a different climate or a different labor market, or to be considerably closer to friends and
family members, should not come into play.  If my sample members moved from one county in one
state to a contiguous county in another state, a likely reason was to take advantage of state-specific
benefits, such as welfare.  According to the welfare magnet hypothesis, individuals most likely to
receive such benefits are more likely to move to a high-benefit state or remain in a high-benefit state.  I
evaluate this hypothesis by comparing the interstate migration rates of poor young women with those of
nonpoor young women and poor young men. Contrary to the recent literature, I find no empirical
support for the welfare magnet hypothesis.  Migratory responses by poor young women are as likely to
disagree as they are to agree with the conjectured forces of welfare magnets.  When they do agree
responses are weak and never statistically significant.  The data provide no strong evidence that welfare
magnets have either an attractive or retentive force.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section two reviews the empirical evidence in support
of the welfare magnet hypothesis.  Section three presents my operational definition of welfare magnets. 
Section four introduces the County to County Migration Flow database and section five describes the
simple statistical approach used to analyze these data.  Section six contains the empirical results and
section seven concludes the paper.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON WELFARE MAGNETS
There is a voluminous literature on this long-standing issue.  The early studies from the 1960s
and 1970s produced controversial and conflicting results and failed to settle the debate.  Researchers
during the 1980s did reach a consensus, however, in part because of the low standards of evidence
applied. 3
The older analyses used aggregate data from the 1960 and 1970 decennial censuses.  Much of
this work correlated gross migration rates of blacks with AFDC benefits (though usually the rates were
not disaggregated by gender).  Covariates, such as the aggregate unemployment rate, were used to
control for local economic conditions, though usually only in the destination state (and usually they
were not disaggregated by race).  Almost invariably the estimated regression coefficient of the benefit
variable was positive and statistically significant.  The historical context of the data makes the
interpretation less than straightforward, as these censuses fall within the Great Migration of blacks from
the rural South to the urban North.   Were individuals moving for better welfare benefits, or were they
1
moving for better economic opportunities?  better housing?  less discrimination?  It was not possible to
sort out these motives with the available aggregate data or the regressions that were used.
Recent studies have used microlevel data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the 1980
decennial census, and the demographic supplement of the Current Population Survey to measure the
effects of welfare magnets.  A consensus is slowly emerging:
2
. . . while interstate migration is indeed a rare event, its impact is not unimportant. . . .
the probabilities indicate that if AFDC families should happen to make an interstate
move, they are much more likely to go to a state with higher AFDC benefits.  In the
long run, even this sluggish and apparently unimportant mobility can alter the interstate
distribution of the AFDC population substantially. Gramlich and Laren (1984, p. 506)
I have found that welfare payments, along with other economic variables, have a
significant effect on the location and migration decisions of female headed households. 
Blank (1988, p. 208)
State redistributive policies are less generous than a national policy in part because low-
income people are sensitive to interstate difference in welfare policy. . . . over time, as
people make major adjustments about whether they should move or remain where they
are, they take into account the level of welfare a state provides and the extent to which
that level is increasing.  The poor do this roughly to the same extent that they respond
to differences in wage opportunities in other states.  Peterson and Rom (1990, p. 83)
Using a variety of data sets, covering periods up to 1985, the [recent] studies all show
positive and significant effects of welfare on residential location and geographic
mobility.  Moffitt (1992, p. 34)4
The most amazing aspect of these studies is that only Blank analyzed individual location decisions. 
Peterson and Rom correlated changes in the proportion of the state's population living in poverty with
changes in AFDC benefits.  Gramlich and Laren analyzed the distribution of AFDC recipients across
states as a function of own-state benefits and lagged benefits from other states.  Blank's study is
superior to the other two, and yet invoked strong functional form assumptions and imposed a highly
aggregated geographical definition of localities.
Yet, it is instructive to compare Long's (1988) conservative assessment of subsidized job-search
and relocation-assistance programs with the growing consensus on welfare magnets just quoted.
A number of experimental programs aimed at [persons who live in areas of persistent
economic hardship, like Appalachia or the rural South, and are unlikely to secure
employment where they live] have been tried from time to time as a means of reducing
poverty and increasing national output by matching workers and jobs.  Evaluating these
programs has been difficult, however.  Although the costs are known, measuring the
benefits tends to be elusive.  Almost any return migration may be interpreted as
program failure, and a perennial question is whether the programs simply pay for
migration that would have occurred anyway.  (Pp. 169–170.)
Long cites an evaluation of a program during the late 1960s and early 1970s to relocate workers
from the Mississippi delta to growing markets with a stronger demand for labor.  Remarkably, within
thirteen months fully 61 percent of the relocatees returned to their original locations.  (This is after
more than a quarter of the eligible population declined the opportunity to relocate.)  I find it interesting
that relocation programs are viewed as unsuccessful while interstate differences in welfare benefits are
perceived as exerting positive and significant effects on residential choice and geographical mobility. 
While the conclusions from the two literatures need not be mutually inconsistent—the central issue of
both literatures is the effect of economic incentives on geographical mobility—I find it unsettling that
they reach different conclusions.  It suggests we should take a closer look at the evidence before
accepting the nascent consensus on welfare magnets.
3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF WELFARE MIGRATION5
Two observations motivate my simple model of welfare migration.  First, people move for any
number of pecuniary and nonpecuniary reasons, suggesting that any interesting model of migration
should not rely on differences in welfare benefits as the sole determinant of migration.  Second, recent
research on welfare dynamics reports that welfare spells are usually short (the median duration is
twenty-four months) and that welfare dependency is best seen as a dynamic process in which
individuals continuously enter and exit the welfare rolls (Blank and Ruggles 1993; Gottschalk and
Moffitt 1994).  Consequently, I adopt a dynamic perspective and consider a model with two locations. 
Each location is characterized by an income stream, y, j=1,2 (net of welfare benefits), and a location-
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specific amenity, a, j=1,2 such that y  > y  and a  < a .   To highlight non-welfare-related motives for
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migration, assume initially that welfare benefits in both locations equal zero.  In each location j and at
each instant t, individuals are "born" and "die" with rates k and e, respectively.  "Birth" in this context
j j
t t
means the creation of an individual potentially eligible to receive welfare benefits; "death" means an
exit from eligibility for welfare (e.g., remarriage).  While these rates are affected by economic
conditions—for example, a growing economy will reduce birth rates and decrease death rates—I
assume that the birth and death rates are independent of welfare benefit levels and consumer
preferences.
Individuals are otherwise homogenous but differ in their valuation of the amenity.  Denote
preferences as U[y(t), a;  ], indexed by the scalar parameter   defined on the unit interval (    [0,1])
j j
with distribution function  ( ).  Preferences are parameterized so that higher values of   denote greater
preferences for income.  Some individuals will be born in their preferred location while all others must
move to their preferred location.  I assume that the environment is stationary and that individuals face
no cost of migration.  Consequently, migration occurs immediately following birth.  Finally, since the
model focuses on migratory flows and not income and prices, it assumes that migration exerts no
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Under perfect certainty, an infinitely lived individual with preferences of type   will prefer to
reside in location 1 if it offers the highest utility; that is, if
where   is the discount rate and V( ) is the discounted lifetime utility flow of residing in location j.  j
The marginal individual, defined as being indifferent between the two locations, has preferences  , n
implicitly defined as
Since larger values of   correspond to stronger preferences for income, individuals with preferences
indexed by   less than   will prefer location 1; conversely, those with preferences indexed by   larger n
than   will prefer location 2.  The proportion of individuals who prefer location 1 is  n
and those who prefer location 2 equals 1-G( ). n
  To define the equilibrium, denote the population at time t in location j as S and the migration
j
t
flow from location j as m.  Figure 1 presents the various flows in the system at time t.  As Figure 1
j
t
indicates, the stock of individuals at location 1 at time t equals last period's stock plus this7
Figure 1
A Diagrammatic Representation of
The Simple Model of Welfare Migration
where
   e = exit rate from location i in period t;
i
t
   k = inflow rate into location i in period t;
i
t
   m = migration rate from location i in period t;
i
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period's births and in-migration less this period's deaths and out-migration; the same is true for location
2:
Assume exit rates are a fixed (exogenous) proportion of the stock at each location, .
The assumption that birth and death rates are independent of preferences implies that a proportion,
G( ), of births will prefer to reside in location 1 and 1-G( ) will prefer location 2.  This means that n n
m  = G( )k  individuals born in location 2 will move to location 1 and m  = (1-G( ))k  individuals
2 2 1 1
t n t t n t
will move from location 1 to 2.  Using the assumed stationarity of the environment (k  = k , etc.), we
1 1
t
can substitute for the exit and migration rates and solve for the steady state populations at each location:
Migration occurs in this model as people correct for the "accidents of birth"; even in the
absence of differences in welfare benefits migration occurs as individuals move into their preferred
location.  Moreover, only if exit rates are identical will the share of the population residing in each
locality be  identical to the proportion of births preferring that location.
Now consider the effect of a difference in welfare benefits between the two locations.  Assume
location 1 is the welfare magnet and offers benefits b so that income there equals y  + b.  Location 2
1
t
does not offer benefits and income remains unchanged at y .  The additional income at location 1 will
2
t
induce some individuals who previously preferred location 2 to now prefer location 1.  (Everyone who
preferred location 1 previously will continue to prefer it.)  Consequently, the indifferent individual willS 1 G( b )(k 1 k 2)
1




have preferences characterized by a larger value of  .  Denote this critical value as  .  The structure of b
the model is otherwise unchanged, and the steady state solution from equation (5) applies with a change
in the critical value from   to  : n b
Notice population shares are relevant to the welfare magnet hypothesis only to the extent that sufficient
information exists to control for economic and social factors leading to differences in birth and death
rates.  Assuming that such differences can be controlled, the model suggests two cross-sectional
analyses that will estimate the force of welfare magnets.  Since welfare benefits are attractive only to
individuals who expect to be eligible to use them, comparisons of migration rates by groups according
to their eligibility are informative.  The equilibrium conditions in equation (5) assume no difference in
benefits between regions and summarize the migration patterns of individuals not eligible to receive
benefits.  Individuals eligible to receive benefits will behave according to equation (6).  The net
migration rate (the difference between the in-migration rate and the out-migration rate) for location 1
(the welfare magnet) by individuals influenced by welfare benefits equals M  = G(a )k  - (1-G(a ))k , b b b
2 1
while the net migration rate of individuals uninfluenced by differences in welfare benefits across
regions is M  = G(a )k  - (1-G(a ))k .  While M  and M  may be positive or negative, the difference M n n n b n b
2 1
- M  must be positive, as   >  .  The force of the magnet depends on the size of the locality's own n b n
birth rate and that of the sending locality.
By the same logic, equations (5) and (6) yield comparable predictions of the migration flows of
the welfare-influenced subpopulation for magnets and nonmagnet regions.  The net migration by the
welfare-influenced group into the welfare magnet equals M , while that into the nonmagnet equals M . b n10
The higher net migration rate by the welfare magnet can be decomposed into two sources:  (1)
the increased in-migration from location 2 (i.e., the "attractive" force of the magnet), which in
equilibrium equals [G( )-G( )]k ; and (2) the reduced out-migration from the magnet (i.e., the b n
2
retentive force of the magnet) equal to -[G( )-G( )]k .  Both forces are positive though not b n
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necessarily equal.  Whether the attractive force or the retentive is larger depends on the relative
magnitudes of birth rates.  An analysis of only net migration rates, while informative, disregards
precious information on its subflows.
It is also natural to think of intertemporal comparisons for subpopulations or regions.  For
example, an increase in relative benefits will induce in-migration and will retard out-migration.  To
recover these effects with cross-sectional data I must assume that the migratory response to a change in
benefits falls neatly within the sample interval used to measure migration.  A large but rapid response
within a long interval or a modest but slow response over a short interval will both appear as negligible
responses in the cross-sectional data.  In practical terms the speed of adjustment relates to how quickly
individuals learn about the change in benefits.  Arguments supporting both fast and slow learning
appear in the literature. With no data to discriminate any conjectured adjustment mechanism or to
control for all other factors affecting migration (represented by the birth and death rates), I did not
pursue time series comparisons.
Consideration of these time series comparisons, however, highlights the key assumption
necessary for my analysis to recover the effect of welfare benefits on migration.  Temporal
comparisons invoke notions of disequilibrium and are fundamentally different than the equilibrium
comparisons described above.  Time series comparisons assume that the stocks of eligibles are fixed
and migration occurs in response to (temporal) changes in benefits.  In the equilibrium models
presented above, benefit levels are constant and migration occurs from the churning of the population at
risk generated by the birth and death processes.  The assumed exogeneity of the births and deaths plays11
the central role in recovering migratory responses to differences in welfare benefits from
cross-sectional data.  Any intertemporal linkage between the population at risk and the benefit level
invalidates my analysis.  For example, recent work on the intergenerational transmission of welfare
dependence suggests that daughters are more likely to receive welfare if raised in homes receiving
welfare.  With persistence in the relative generosity of benefits across states, if the mother moved in
response to higher benefits the daughter would not need to move, and my measures of welfare-induced
migration will understate the true effect.  Similarly, if individuals move to a high-benefit area in
anticipation of drawing benefits, the population at risk will not be independent of the benefit rate, and
my analysis will again understate the true effect.  Indeed, the understatement will increase the more
foresight individuals have.  For this problem a long migration window is an advantage.
The theoretical model offers little guidance on implementation and particularly on the proper
level of geographical disaggregation.  It is a nontrivial issue because data requirements and
computational demands grow as the definition of locations becomes finer.  The importance of labor
market factors in locational decisions suggests that localities should be considered as different only if
their labor markets are different.  The size of the local labor market will differ depending on the
individual's characteristics and labor market skills.  However, local labor markets are presumably
geographically small for low-income individuals, and so one would prefer a detailed, highly
disaggregated representation of locations.  Yet, discrete choice estimation procedures impose severe
restrictions on the number of alternative locations.  One can think of the existing studies as using fine
covariates and aggregate geographical measures to measure welfare magnets.  This study uses gross
covariate structures and fine geographical partitions to measure the same behavior.  Hence, this analysis
provides alternative estimates of welfare magnets to assess the robustness of the earlier findings.
The basic premise of this paper is that each welfare magnet (defined below) is bordered by at
least one state that should not be a welfare magnet.  The analysis avoids determining subtle differences12
in individual decision-making by concentrating on the interstate movement of individuals among border
counties of contiguous states (though I control for some county characteristics such as the crime rate
and unemployment rate).  Although welfare migrants may come from noncontiguous states,
presumably potential magnetic effects should be strongest on border and near-border communities. 
These moves will be short-distance moves, and it is unlikely they are climate- or job-related or
motivated by a desire to be closer to friends and family.  Most importantly, individuals in border and
near-border communities should be well-informed about welfare benefits and other local conditions in
all surrounding counties.  By assuming that all excess migration by low-income women of childbearing
age is welfare induced, the analysis provides an upper bound on the magnitude of welfare magnets. 
Because it cannot identify the intent of migrants (except by assumption), the analysis cannot "prove"
the existence of magnets, but it can invalidate the welfare magnet hypothesis.
4. DEFINING WELFARE MAGNETS IN 1980
The Food Stamp (FS) program and the program Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) are the two major assistance programs available to low-income households.   Whereas FS is a
4
national program with a common set of rules across states, AFDC is administered locally and benefits
are determined at the state level.  AFDC benefits are set independently of FS transfers, but AFDC
benefits are recognized as household income in the determination of FS eligibility.  Consequently,
families in a high AFDC benefit state (e.g., California) receive lower FS benefits than do families
living in a low AFDC benefit state (e.g., Mississippi).  To recognize these program interdependencies, I
measure welfare benefits as the combined AFDC and FS monthly payment to a family of three.
Using this definition, I consider differences in monthly benefits between states of $85 or more
to be larger for two reasons.  First, policy debates in the Wisconsin legislature and the popular press
during the mid-1980s labeled Wisconsin as a welfare magnet for Illinois residents.  Since the13
mid-1970s the difference between Wisconsin and Illinois in FS-AFDC benefits for a family of three has
remained between $90–$100.   Second, the empirical distribution of benefit differences across states
5
suggests that a difference of $85 or more is large.
States with large benefits run the risk of being a magnet, while states with low benefits may be
a source of migrants.  The difference between the state's benefit and the minimum benefit in adjacent
states identifies possible sources of in-migration, while the difference between the state's benefit and
the maximum benefit in adjacent states identifies possible sources of welfare-driven out-migration. 
Table 1 shows the combined Food Stamp and AFDC monthly benefit for a family of three in constant
1980 dollars for calendar years 1975 and 1980.  Columns three and six report the minimum combined
benefit in an adjacent state for 1975 and 1980, while columns four and seven report the maximum
combined monthly benefit in an adjacent state for those years.  The decline in real benefits is striking;
only three states increased their real benefits between 1975 and 1980.  The decline in the variability of
combined benefits is less striking but also present.  Notice the decline in the standard deviation of
benefits between 1975 and 1980 and the decline in the mean difference between the maximum and
minimum in adjacent states.  Apparently, states used the Food Stamp program to offset lower real
AFDC benefits.  As shown in the columns listing adjacent state maximum and minimum benefits, it is
unusual for adjacent states to offer widely disparate benefit levels.   Notice that many of the differences
6
are between 40 and 60 dollars per month with a few differences more than about $85.14
TABLE 1
Total Combined Monthly Food Stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent Children Benefits in 1975 and 1980
                          1975                                                      1980                          
  Minimum   Maximum   Minimum   Maximum
   Own   Combined   Combined    Own   Combined   Combined
  Number of Combined  Benefit in an  Benefit in an Combined  Benefit in an  Benefit in an
Adjacent States   Benefit Adjacent State Adjacent State   Benefit Adjacent State Adjacent State
State         (1)      (2)         (3)         (4)      (5)         (6)         (7)
Alabama 4 $335  $244  $376  $279  $257  $347 
Arizona 4 397  403  540  352  365  542 
Arkansas 6 355  244  456  322  257  408 
California 3 540  397  588  542  352  408 
Colorado 6 456  403  570  414  365  463 
Connecticut 3 598  502  582  543  449  486 
Delaware 3 460  437  558  397  400  463 
Florida 2 376  335  353  347  279  325 
Georgia 4 353  317  376  325  279  347 
Idaho 6 547  432  588  437  392  531 
Illinois 5 504  349  593  412  342  521 
Indiana 4 437  421  584  389  342  508 
Iowa 6 541  349  593  463  384  521 
Kansas 4 570  349  456  452  384  428 
Kentucky 7 421  344  512  342  283  428 
Louisiana 3 358  244  355  313  257  322 
Maine 1 411  556  556  407  453  453 
Maryland 4 437  444  543  400  355  443 
Massachusetts 5 502  523  598  476  449  555 
Michigan 3 584  437  593  508  389  521 
Minnesota 4 580  529  593  502  435  521 
Mississippi 4 244  335  358  257  279  322 
Missouri 8 349  344  570  384  283  463 
Montana 4 439  476  547  392  431  444 
Nebraska 6 448  349  570  428  384  463 
Nevada 5 432  397  588  394  352  542 
New Hampshire 3 556  411  571  453  407  555 
New Jersey 3 558  460  582  463  397  486 
New Mexico 5 403  345  495  365  277  463 
New York 3 582  543  598  486  443  555 
North Carolina 3 419  317  512  345  283  428 
North Dakota 3 529  439  580  444  392  502 
Ohio 5 442  421  584  395  342  508 
Oklahoma 6 456  345  570  408  277  452 
Oregon 4 588  432  564  408  394  542 
Pennsylvania 6 543  437  582  443  355  486 
Rhode Island 2 523  502  598  449  476  543 
South Carolina 2 317  353  419  290  325  345 
South Dakota 6 535  439  580  435  392  502 
Tennessee 9 344  244  512  283  257  428 
Texas 4 345  355  456  277  313  408 
Utah 6 495  397  547  463  352  437 
(table continues)15
TABLE 1, continued
                          1975                                                      1980                          
  Minimum   Maximum   Minimum   Maximum
   Own   Combined   Combined    Own   Combined   Combined
  Number of Combined  Benefit in an  Benefit in an Combined  Benefit in an  Benefit in an
Adjacent States   Benefit Adjacent State Adjacent State   Benefit Adjacent State Adjacent State
State         (1)      (2)         (3)         (4)      (5)         (6)         (7)
Vermont 3 571  502  582  555  453  486 
Virginia 5 512  344  444  428  283  400 
Washington 2 564  547  588  531  408  437 
West Virginia 5 444  421  543  355  342  443 
Wisconsin 4 593  504  584  521  412  508 
Wyoming 6 476  439  547  431  392  463 
Mean $468  $410 
Standard Deviation $89  $75 
Mean   ( Max - Min ) $124            $102           
Source:  1991 Green Book.
Note:  Benefits are for three-person families.16
Figures 2 and 3 show the magnetic flows of welfare magnets in 1975 and 1980.  In 1975,
several large clusters of differences between state benefit levels existed.  Benefits in Kansas and
California exceeded benefits in all surrounding states while Missouri and Mississippi had significantly
lower benefits than most of their neighbors.  A couple of new differences appeared in 1980, but nearly
all of the large differences were eliminated.
The analysis focuses on three magnets:  Wisconsin (a magnet to Illinois), Michigan (a magnet
to Indiana and Ohio), and Virginia (a magnet to Tennessee).  The analysis uses the border counties of
these states and border counties of all states contiguous to the three magnets.  To be considered a
magnet, in both 1975 and 1980 a state had to offer combined FS and AFDC benefits that were at least
$85 greater than those offered by a neighboring state.  This requirement eliminated several of the 1975
magnets.  Long's (1988) comprehensive review of internal migration patterns documents the
substantial, continual westward flow of migrants during the twentieth century.  California's natural
resources, climate, and historical position have made it a magnet for all Americans for the last century
and a half.  Consequently, I excluded California from the analysis.  Also, because the populations on
the Oklahoma-Texas and Utah–Arizona–New Mexico borders are sparse and the counties are large
relative to counties east of the Mississippi, I excluded the Oklahoma and Utah magnets.
4. DATA 
The data used for this analysis are from the County to County Migration Flow File developed
from the 1980 census.  It identifies all intercounty flows within states and each intercounty flow of at
least 100 persons among states.  Twenty-two separate cross-tabulations summarize the joint distribution
of various combinations of the migrant's age, race, gender, income, occupation,17
Figure 2
Welfare Magnet Flows 1975
Figure 3
Welfare Magnet Flows 198018
education, industry, college attendance, and armed forces status.  My analysis uses a three-way
tabulation of migration by gender, age, and income.
The analysis selects all border counties of the conjectured magnets and the surrounding states. 
The basic unit of analysis is a county-to-county migration flow for each age, income, and gender cell. 
With a few exceptions associated with large metropolitan areas (e.g., Chicago and Milwaukee) the
intercounty flows are restricted to be between contiguous counties.  The analysis file includes therefore
both intrastate and interstate migration flows.  Information on county-specific conditions
(unemployment rate, the crime rate, per capita tax rates, government expenditures, and the number of
physicians) is matched from the County and City Data Bank.   "Great Circle" distances between
7
counties are obtained for county population centroids from the Master Area Reference File 1980.
8
Two serious limitations plague the County to County Migration Flow data.  First, migration is
defined relative to a five-year migration window so that sample migration rates underestimate
population migration rates.  Individuals living in different locations in 1975 and 1980 are considered
migrants.  Individuals who move and return to their 1975 county by 1980 are classified as nonmigrants. 
Similarly, individuals with repeated moves between 1975 and 1980 will have at most one move
recorded during the migration window.
The second major limitation is that the income measure refers to the individual's 1979 income. 
Unfortunately, income for calendar year 1979 may reflect neither premigration nor postmigration
income.  Possible endogeneity issues arise as the reported income may be the result of the move.  The
sparseness of the covariate structure of the data precludes constructing potential instruments.  
9
Moreover, nonworking married women may report having zero income, yet may live in households
with substantial resources.  Inspection of the data reveals that women are far more likely than men to
have no income.  As a partial solution, I exclude the lowest income group when defining low-income
("poor") households.Yk E[Yk Xk] k
Yk (Xk, ) k
(Xk, ) exp(xk )
E[ k Xk] 0




I use two statistical approaches to measure the influence of welfare benefits on migration
behavior.  The first recognizes the discrete nature of the migration count data including the large
number of zero migration flows.  The second approach uses the panel nature of the data to estimate the
equivalent of a fixed-effect model that controls for the identities of the sending and receiving counties. 
This parameterization has the advantage of a simpler interpretative basis at the cost of less attention to
zeros and counts.  I describe each approach in turn.
The first approach uses a simple nonlinear regression framework to model the discrete
migration counts.  Let Y  denote the number of migrants for the kth intercounty migration stream k
(recall that the unit of analysis is a county-to-county migration flow) and X  the associated (exogenous) k
covariate vector.  I assume that for each observation k: 
where   is the parameter vector to be estimated.  This representation of the conditional mean function
has the desirable feature that all predicted counts from the model will be positive.  As an added
advantage, this representation is nearly identical to the popular Poisson regression model.  Indeed, the
only difference between it and my specification is that I do not impose the Poisson assumption that the
conditional mean and variance are equal.  At the cost of being less efficient than the Poisson regression
model (when a Poisson is the true model), the nonlinear least squares estimator is consistent for a broad20
class of models.  For example, except for the intercept term, the nonlinear least squares estimator is
consistent for both the Poisson and negative binomial models or any member of the linear exponential
family.   Gourieroux et al. (1984a, 1984b) label estimators for the linear exponential family a "pseudo
10
maximum likelihood estimator" (more commonly referred to as a "quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator").  Yet, nomenclature aside, the key property is the orthogonality condition specified in
equation (7).  Specification of the density only determines the most efficient estimator, which in
practice means parameterizing the form of conditional heteroscedasticity.  A more robust approach is to
estimate robust (Huber-White) standard errors.   Since the nonlinear least squares estimator nests the
11
Poisson regression model as a special case, the interpretative insight and intuition gained from the latter
model can be applied directly.  There seems to be little gained by thinking about quasi-maximum
likelihood estimation; the estimation problem is more usefully thought of as recovering a conditional
mean function (i.e., a standard regression problem).
12
The second approach uses ordinary least squares with the dependent variable defined as the
ratio of migration rates.  An advantage of this procedure is that it controls for the characteristics of the
receiving and sending counties.  The analysis of the count data uses gross covariates to control for the
characteristics of the sending and receiving counties.  However, other unmeasured factors may make
particular county-to-county flows different, such as chain migration, whereby past migration between
counties has built strong informational and other connections between counties which serve to raise
migration rates in the current period.  Also, unmeasured aggregate shocks, such as labor market
conditions, may affect all age groups or both genders equally, but will have differential spatial effects. 
There may be something special about Cook County (Chicago) which is not captured by the simple
covariates of the first approach.  The present analysis does so.
In this analysis the dependent variable is the ratio of county-specific migration rates of the
























uninfluenced by welfare benefits.  Poor young women represent the welfare-sensitive group, while two
parameterizations—nonpoor young women and poor young men—are employed for the comparison
groups.  Separately neither group is completely adequate, but together they are informative.  Again,
county-to-county flows are the unit of analysis.  Rather than including all of the age, gender, and
income groups, this analysis uses only those observations needed to construct the dependent variable.
To see the relationship between the count and rate regressions, let poor young men represent
the comparison group, and index by k each of the county-to-county flows.  For example, Milwaukee
County to Cook County will be one flow and Cook to Milwaukee will be another.  Let   denote the
migration rate (per thousand) of poor young women moving along the kth county-to-county flow; let
 denote the migration rate of poor young men moving along the same flow.  Assuming a counting
model with multiplicative errors is correct, then in logarithms, the counting model for these two
subgroups is
13
Taking differences, and assuming that the migration rate of males is nonzero, the estimating equation is
where  =  -  .   The regressors will include controls for distance, an indicator variable for whether
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the flow crosses state boundaries, and a measure of welfare benefits at the sending and receiving
locations.  In this parameterization, if welfare magnets exist the estimated coefficient on the welfare22
benefit variable should be positive.  That is, poor young women should have a greater responsiveness to
the benefits than should poor young men or nonpoor young women.  The primary advantage of this
approach over the first is that it controls for idiosyncratic factors at the source and destination locations. 
I estimate equation (9) using ordinary least squares and report White-Huber standard errors. 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
I present three forms of evidence on the force of welfare magnets.  The first is a descriptive
analysis that compares unadjusted county-level migration flows.  I then present evidence from the
analysis of counts (regression approach 1, section 6.2) and the regression analysis of the pairwise ratio
of migration rates which controls for source and end destination (regression approach 2, section 6.3).
6.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis.  The unit of analysis
is the migration flow from one border county to another.  Relatively few individuals (approximately
seven individuals, or slightly more than eleven per thousand) in each age, income, and gender cell
migrate between counties, suggesting the usefulness of the counting model.  Few individual
characteristics are reported, reflecting the tabular nature of the data.  To reduce the number of
estimated parameters in the models I pooled some of the age and income cells.  As an attempt to23
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics:  Border Counties of Migration Flow File
(Number of Observations 142,435)
Description Mean Std.
Migration and Population Variables
cnt Number of migrants  7.9728 64.724 
exps Population count 1098.0 5898.7 
rate Number of migrants per 1000 population 11.078 45.056 
dist Distance in miles between destination and origin  26.752 12.984 
Individual Characteristics
poor Binary variable = 1 if 0 < income < $5000 0.2402 0.4272 
young Binary variable = 1 if age   44 0.5880 0.4922 
female Binary variable = 1 if female  0.4788 0.4996 
ism Binary variable = 1 interstate move 0.1832 0.3868 
pf Poor*female 0.1204 0.3254 
py Poor*young 0.1439 0.3510 
yf Young*female 0.2792 0.4486 
pyf Poor*young*female 0.0722 0.2588 
Benefit Variables (and Interactions)
db Difference in benefits (destination  -  source) -1.4167 27.368 
fdb Female*db -0.6749 19.061 
pdb Poor*db -0.3499 13.235 
ydb Young*db -0.8264 21.075 
pfdb Poor*female*db -0.1756 9.361 
pydb Poor*young*db -0.2097 10.252 
yfdb Young*female*db -0.3917 14.618 
pyfdb Poor*young*female*db -0.1055 7.251 
ATM Binary variable = 1 if benefits in 
destination  - source > $85 0.0190 0.1365 
REM Binary variable =1 if benefits in 
source - destination  > $85 0.0176 0.1317 
fATM Female*ATM 0.0092 0.0957 
fREM  Female*REM 0.0086 0.0924 




Benefit Variables (and Interactions), continued
pREM Poor*REM 0.0041 0.0637 
yATM Young*ATM 0.0113 0.1056 
pfATM Poor*female*ATM 0.0022 0.0446 
pfREM Poor*female*REM 0.0020 0.0451 
pyATM Poor*young*ATM 0.0026 0.0510 
pyREM Poor*young*REM 0.0024 0.0494 
yfATM Young*female*ATM 0.0054 0.0736 
yfREM Young*female*REM 0.0051 0.0711 
pyfATM Poor*young*female*ATM 0.0013 0.0361 
pyfREM Poor*young*female*REM  0.0012 0.0345 
Location Characteristics 
f_wi Binary variable = 1 if flow state = WI 0.0801  0.2713 
f_mi Binary variable = 1 if flow state = MI 0.0400  0.1959 
f_va Binary variable = 1 if flow state = VA 0.1127  0.3163 
dcrate Difference in crime rates -3.5025  2046.0 
dptax Difference in property taxes 0.1788  59.549 
dge Difference in government expend -2.6168  207.4 
dphy Difference in number of physicians 11.902  1297.2 
dune Difference in unemployment rate -0.1969  21.435 
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.25
approximate age groups with dependent children living in the household I pooled the three youngest age
groups (ages 16–24, 25–34, and 35–44).  Women in these age groups were defined as "young."  The
poverty line for a family of three was approximately $5000 in 1980.  The three lowest income classes
fell in or near the official poverty line in 1980.  However, as mentioned above, the lowest income class
was "no income."  I suspected that many of the women reporting no income had no earned income, but
lived in nonpoor households.  Consequently, I excluded this group and only considered households
having nonzero income below $5000 as "poor" (income groups 2 and 3).  By this measure
approximately 25 percent of the migratory flows represented movement by poor people.  I defer the
discussion of the benefit variables and county covariates until the review of the regression estimates. 
First, I present some descriptive evidence on migration patterns in my sample and preliminary evidence
on welfare magnets.
Figure 4 presents box plots of mean migration rates by gender, age group, income group, and
distance.  Box plots offer a simple description of the distribution.  The third and first quartile of the
distribution define the top and bottom of the box; the distribution's median is the line in the interior of
the box.  The lines emanating from the box extend to the 10th and 90th percentiles.  The patterns
reported in Figure 4 replicate many of the migratory patterns documented in the literature (e.g., Long
1988).  The most distinctive feature, representing the restriction to migration streams between
contiguous (and nearly contiguous) counties, is the compressed distance distribution.  For these short-
distance streams, females are slightly more likely to migrate than are males, and the gradient of income
is only weakly positive.  A steep age gradient in migration rates appears, even for these short-distance
moves.  Of course, long-distance moves, for example to the sun-belt from north-central states, are
excluded by the sampling frame, which may account for the steep age gradient.
Table 3 presents evidence pertaining to the welfare magnet hypothesis.  It lists five hypotheses
implied by the welfare magnet theory.  The hypotheses have the structure of inequality restrictions on26
Figure 4
Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis File
from the County to County Migration Flow Files 198027
TABLE 3
Joint One-Sided Significance Tests of Directional Migration Flows
I. Exit rates from welfare magnets among poor young women should be lower than from attracted
states
Magnet Exit Rates Nonmagnet Exit Difference
Comparison      (per 1000) Rates (per 1000) Difference under Null
          (1)          (2)      (3)       (4)
IL v. WI 15.4 8.6 6.8 6.8
TN v. VA 11.4 11.2 0.2 0.2
IN v. MI 10.7 11.2 -0.5 0.0
OH v. MI 10.7 8.2 2.5 2.5
                            Test Statistic = 33.63                                    P-value = 0.0000
II. Exit rates from welfare magnets among poor young women should be lower than those among
nonpoor young women
   Exit Rates
  Exit Rates among among Nonpoor Difference
Magnet Poor Young Women  Young Women Difference under Null
           (1)          (2)      (3)       (4)
Wisconsin 15.4 10.2 5.2 5.2
Michigan 10.7 16.2 -5.5 0.0
Virginia 11.2 14.5 -3.3 0.0
                            Test Statistic = 1.83                                      P-value = 0.2923 
III. Exit rates from welfare magnets among poor young women should be lower than those among
poor young men
  Exit Rates among Exit Rates among Difference
Magnet Poor Young Women Poor Young Men Difference under Null
           (1)         (2)      (3)      (4)
Wisconsin 15.4 7.6 7.8 7.8
Michigan 10.7 8.8 1.9 1.9
Virginia 11.2 14.8 -3.6 0.0
                            Test Statistic = 1.06                                      P-value = 0.4328
(table continues)( 1 2)




IV. The attractive force of the magnet will cause the in-migration rates of poor young women to
exceed those of nonpoor young women
  Entry Rates   Entry Rates
  of Nonpoor      of Poor Difference
Flow Young Women Young Women Difference under Null
       (1)        (2)      (3)      (4)
IL to WI 3.0 4.2 -1.2 0.0
TN to VA 5.8 8.3 -2.5 0.0
IN to MI 7.8 6.0 1.8 1.8
OH to MI 4.8 5.9 -1.1 0.0
                            Test Statistic = 0.047                                    P-value = 0.8852
V. The attractive force of the magnet will cause the in-migration rates of poor young women to
exceed those of poor young men
  Entry Rates of     Entry Rates of Difference
Flow Poor Young Men Poor Young Women Difference under Null
        (1)          (2)      (3)      (4)
IL to WI 4.0 4.2 -0.2 0.0
TN to VA 8.0 8.3 -0.3 0.0
IN to MI 7.6 6.0 1.6 1.6
OH to MI 5.1 5.9 -0.8 0.0
                             Test Statistic = 0.283                                   P-Value = 0.7732
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.
Note: The test statistic is defined as  , where   is the difference in estimated
migration rates under the null hypothesis, and   is the corresponding covariance matrix.  As shown
by Goldberger (1991) and Wolak (1987) the distribution of the test statistic is a mixture of chi squares.Ho: 1 2 vs Ha: 1< 2.
( 1 2)
1
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sample migration rates for subgroups within the population.  They were tested using simple
(unconditional) migration rates and a multivariate extension of the univariate one-sided hypothesis test
developed by Frank Wolak (1987).  To define the test, I let  i denote a vector of mean migration rates. 
The hypotheses were of the form
The test statistic assumed the usual quadratic form,  , but was evaluated under
the null hypothesis.  Under the null, negative differences were reset to zero, probability mass
accumulated at zero, and the distribution of the test statistic became a mixture of chi square random
variables.  For the small dimensional vectors arising here, computational formulas in Wolak (1987)
permitted easy numerical evaluation of the appropriate tail probabilities to obtain p-values.
Since poor young women are most likely to be eligible for and receive welfare, their migration
rates should be such that they give the most support to the welfare magnet hypothesis.  In evaluating the
hypotheses I constructed comparisons that should be most favorable to the welfare magnet hypothesis. 
In particular, I compared migration streams between the conjectured magnet and the attracted state (or
in the case of Michigan, states).  The first three hypotheses pertain to the retentive force of the magnet. 
According to the first hypothesis, exit rates by poor young women should be lower from magnets than
from nonmagnets.  As is usual in hypothesis testing for falsification purposes, the hypothesis test
evaluated the converse of the conjecture.  Columns one and two of the first block of Table 3 report exit
rates from magnet and nonmagnet states.  Evidence supporting the conjecture appears as negative (or
small) differences in column three.  For clarity, the final column reports the differences in means under
the null.  For three of the four comparisons, exit rates from magnets exceeded those of nonmagnets and30
the null was decisively rejected.  Hypotheses two and three pertain to exit rates of poor young women
vis-à-vis those of nonpoor young women and poor young men.  These two subgroups should face many
of the same migration incentives facing poor young women but should be less eligible to obtain
welfare.  These hypotheses were not rejected, yet in three of the six cases, exit rates by poor young
women exceeded those of the comparison groups.
The remaining two hypotheses relate to the attractive force of magnets.  Poor young women
living in low-benefit states should be more likely to be pulled into the magnet than either nonpoor
young women or poor young men.  But in-migration rates of poor young women into magnets were not
much different from in-migration rates of nonpoor young women and poor young men, and the
hypotheses were not rejected at conventional test levels.  In six of the eight comparisons, rates by poor
young women were larger than rates for the comparison groups, but the difference between groups was
small, on the order of one per thousand.  However, the estimated variances were too large to reject the
null hypothesis.
It is interesting to compare location-specific exit and entry rates, although they are not relevant
to the welfare magnet hypothesis.  As reported in the last block of Table 3, entry rates into the magnets
by poor young women were 4.2 (IL to WI), 6.0 (IN to MI), 5.9 (OH to MI), and 8.3 (TN to VA).  Exit
rates by poor young women from the magnets to the attracted states were 4.9 (WI to IL), 12.9 (MI to
IN), 9.4 (MI to OH), and 17.9 (VA to TN).  In all four cases, exit rates were larger than the entrance
rates for the group which supposedly was most likely to remain in the magnet.  With one exception
(flows between Indiana and Michigan by poor young men), the same pattern emerged for nonpoor
young women and poor young men, suggesting that differences in state benefits affect poor young
women in much the same way as they do these two subgroups of the population.  It is consistent with
the general finding in the migration literature that locations of high in-migration also exhibit high out-
migration rates.  This observation is also the primary argument against analyzing net migration rates.31
The unconditional migration rates suggest two important patterns.  First, there is no evidence in
favor of the retentive force of welfare magnets.  Whatever factors tie low-income persons to a location,
the unconditional migration rates suggest that higher welfare benefits are not among them.  Second, the
data do not disprove that welfare magnets may exert some attractive force, yet if there is an attractive
force it is weak.
6.2 Regression Analysis of the Count Data
I employ two parameterizations of the benefit variables.  The first, db, is the difference in
monthly benefits, defined as benefits at the destination less benefits at the origin.  The benefit variable
is nonzero only for interstate migration.  This parameterization gives information on the importance of
the quantitative difference in benefits between the origin and destination sites.  Since greater benefit
levels in the destination county should increase in-migration while greater benefits in the origin county
should lower out-migration, the algebraic sign of this variable is expected to be positive.  The other
parameterization defines two main benefit variables.  ATM equals one if combined monthly AFDC and
Food Stamp benefits at the destination are at least 85 dollars per month greater than the combined
monthly benefits in the origin site.  REM equals one if combined benefits in the origin location are at
least 85 dollars greater than combined monthly benefits in the destination site.  While less informative
on the importance of the quantitative differences in benefits, this parameterization permits asymmetric
responses and captures the two conjectured forces of magnets.  Thus, ATM measures the attractive
force, while REM measures the retentive force of the magnet.
The last group of variables listed in Table 2 are included as gross controls for county
characteristics that may be expected to influence the migration rate.  Least precise in this group are
three dummy variables for the three alleged magnets.  Also included among the county characteristics
are the crime rate per 100,000 individuals in 1978, the per capita property tax rate in 1978, the per
capita local government expenditures, the number of physicians in all the county (as of 1980), and the32
unemployment rate in 1978.  To the greatest extent possible I obtained covariate values defined near the
approximate mid-point of the migration window.  Reflecting the notion that relative, not absolute,
values matter, county characteristics enter the model specification in difference form (destination -
origin), as did the benefit variable.
Regression estimates of the counting model are reported in Tables 4 and 5.  The baseline
specification appears in the left-most column in Tables 4 and 5.  This specification includes the main
and interactive terms of the personal characteristics and the benefit variable(s).  Since the primary
subpopulation of interest is poor young females, all second-order interaction terms are included to
properly parcel out the effect of benefits on this group.  The middle group of estimates adds indicator
variables for the magnet states as destination locations.  The right-most group of estimates adds
differences in county characteristics to the second specification.  At the foot of each table are the
number of observations and the Pseudo R .
2
The estimated coefficients of the covariates common to Tables 4 and 5 reveal remarkably
similar patterns across the two specifications.   The full set of interaction terms of the individual
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characteristics and the benefit variables makes it difficult to glean behavioral patterns from reviewing
the estimated coefficients.  However, a couple of patterns do emerge.  First, notice the large negative
estimated coefficient on the interstate dummy variable.  Even for border counties, interstate migration
is approximately 40 percent less frequent (e.g., 1-exp(-.8725)) than within-state intercounty migration. 
Similarly, the young are 2.7 times more likely to move than the old.  Notice as well that the inclusion of
the destination-state dummies and the county-level covariates has little impact on the other estimated
coefficients (compare the right-most estimates with estimates of the baseline).  However, a33
TABLE 4
Regression Estimates—Benefit Variable; Dependent Variable:  Number of Intercounty Migrants
(Robust Standard Errors)
Variable Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
intercept -3.9356  0.3200 -3.8970 0.4328  -3.8750  0.2999 
poor -0.0305 0.2915 -0.0272 0.2817 -0.0469  0.2351 
young 0.9920 0.3598 0.9930 0.3245 0.9975  0.2690 
female -0.0416 0.3048 -0.0421 0.2987 -0.0376  0.2356 
py -0.4150 0.4070 -0.4159 0.3521 -0.3988  0.3035 
pf 0.0285 0.3914 0.0135 0.3815 0.0312  0.3182 
yf 0.0268 0.4166 0.0206 0.3693 0.0173  0.3023 
pyf 0.3065 0.4929 0.3098 0.4487 0.2933  0.3872 
ism -0.8725 0.1019 -0.8510 0.1381 -0.8368  0.0847 
dist -0.0520 0.0078 -0.0567 0.0114 -0.0534 0.0096 
db -0.0005 0.0026 -0.0017 0.0024 -0.0017  0.0021 
ydb -0.0011 0.0039 -0.0011 0.0033 -0.0010  0.0026 
pdb 0.0030 0.0031 0.0032 0.0028 0.0034  0.0026 
fdb -0.0005 0.0032 -0.0005 0.0029 -0.0005  0.0023 
pydb -0.0007 0.0051 -0.0010 0.0032 -0.0012  0.0042 
pfdb -0.0018 0.0042 -0.0020 0.0038 -0.0021  0.0033 
yfdb 0.0007 0.0047 0.0005 0.0039 0.0005  0.0031 
pyfdb 0.0007 0.0062 0.0008 0.0050 0.0008 0.0050 
f_wi 0.2627  0.2287 0.3582 0.3067 
f_mi 0.5491  0.1936 0.4786  0.2684 
f_va -0.3486 0.3456 -0.4922  0.2395 
dcrate 0.0001 4.7E-5 
dptax 0.0005 0.0009 
dge 0.0046 0.0002 
ydph 0.0001 3.5E-5 
dune -0.0076 0.0051 




Counting Model Regression Estimates—Benefit Variables:   ATM and REM;
Dependent Variable:  Number of Intercounty Migrants 
(Robust Standard Errors)
Variable Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
intercept -3.8812  0.3079  -3.8729  0.4191  -3.8200  0.3000 
poor -0.0316  0.2909  -0.0326  0.2792  -0.0537  0.2334 
young 0.9924  0.3577  0.9931  0.3225  0.9976  0.1068 
female -0.0362  0.3007  -0.0371  0.2925  -0.0325  0.2304 
ism -0.9810  0.1137  -0.9456  0.1704  -0.9092  0.1068 
dist -0.0544  0.0074  -0.0592  0.0114  -0.0554  0.0098 
ATM 0.3025  0.3519  0.0826  0.4405  0.0187  0.4404 
REM 0.7493  0.4175  0.8383  0.4541  0.6423  0.4093 
py -0.4271  0.4057  -0.4289  0.3506  -0.4073  0.3019 
pf 0.0184  0.3902  0.0125  0.3770  0.0303  0.3152 
yf 0.0133  0.4127  0.0133  0.3641  0.0099  0.2977 
pyf 0.3200  0.4916  0.3218  0.4455  0.3052  0.3851 
pATM 0.3764  0.3617  0.4290  0.3408  0.4610  0.3185 
pREM -0.2245  0.4446  -0.2358  0.4320  -0.2321  0.4180 
fATM -0.1568  0.3441  -0.1495  0.3178  -0.1575  0.2862 
fREM -0.0862  0.3938  -0.0835  0.3807  -0.0867  0.3423 
yATM -0.0686  0.4028  -0.0637  0.3577  -0.0671  0.3370 
yREM 0.1093  0.4339  0.1063  0.4018  0.0956  0.3600 
pfATM -0.1213  0.4806  -0.1659  0.4555  -0.1700  0.4284 
pfREM 0.2220  0.5916  0.2352  0.5722  0.2332  0.5517 
pyATM 0.1220  0.4904  0.0716  0.4355  0.0464  0.4419 
pyREM 0.2510  0.5600  0.2583  0.5081  0.2656  0.4930 
yfATM 0.1876  0.4930  0.1922  0.4315  0.1933  0.3983 
yfREM 0.1830  0.5111  0.1827  0.4638  0.1844  0.4211 
pyfATM -0.1724  0.6345  -0.1531  0.5684  -0.1443  0.5767 
pyfREM -0.3756  0.7189  -0.3859  0.6713  -0.3848  0.6580 
f_wi 0.2347  0.2293  0.3299  0.3216 
f_mi 0.5244  0.1882  0.4562  0.2606 
f_va -0.3903  0.3351  -0.5200  0.2480 
dcrate 0.0001   4.7E-5 
dtax 0.0004  0.0009 
dge 0.0005  0.0002 
dphy 0.0001  3.5E-5 
dune -0.0077  0.0051 
Pseudo R 0.3362  0.3562  0.4022 
2
N = 142,435
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.35
comparison of the Pseudo-R  values implies that the additional covariates substantially improve the fit. 
2
The estimated coefficients for the county characteristics do not always have the expected algebraic
sign.  In particular, the estimated coefficient of the difference in crime rates should be negative, as
higher crime rates in the destination location should reduce in-migration and lower crime rates at the
original location should reduce out-migration.  However, discussions with experts at the Census Bureau
suggest the crime variables may be ridden with error.   The estimated coefficient on the difference in
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property tax rates also violates expectations (but with large standard errors).  Interestingly, although it
is defined only at a point in time during the middle of the migration window, the difference in
unemployment rates operates according to expectations regarding the importance of labor market
conditions as a primary determinant of migration.  The statistical significance of the county-level
characteristics suggests that the sample restriction to adjacent counties does not entirely purge the effect
of local conditions.
The large number of interaction effects within the nonlinear model makes it difficult to visually
determine the effect of welfare benefits on migration rates.  Table 6 reports joint tests of the statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients.  Once again, I compare estimates for poor young women
with those for nonpoor young women and poor young men.  The top half of Table 6 reports test
statistics and p-values for the db parameterization, while the bottom portion reports results for the
dummy variable (ATM, REM) representation of benefits.  The first rows of each block report test
statistics comparing poor young women and nonpoor young women, while the third row compares poor
young women and poor young men.  Rows two and four report the difference in estimated benefit
effects between poor young women and the two control groups.  Reflecting the large standard errors in
Tables 4 and 5, few of the comparisons in Table 6 are statistically significant at conventional test
levels.  Both benefit parameterizations indicate that the migratory behavior of poor young women is
different from that of nonpoor young women.  The important result from the table, however, is that36
TABLE 6
Tests of the Equality of Estimated Coefficients
      Add Destination
        Base Model             Dummy Variables     Add County Characteristics
Comparison Test Statistic P-Value Test Statistic P-Value Test Statistic P-Value
Benefits parameterized by db
Poor young women versus
nonpoor young women 1.85 .0632 2.13 .0296 1.74 .0838
Effect of benefits on poor
young women versus
nonpoor young women 0.47 .7565 0.57 .6820 0.74 .5633
Poor young women versus
poor young men 1.49 .1537 1.98 .0442 1.42 .1803
Effect of benefits on poor
young women versus
poor young men 0.24 .9148 0.33 .8567 0.37 .8295
Benefits parameterized by ATM & REM
Poor young women versus 
nonpoor young women 1.35 .1799 1.80 .0419 1.54 .0926
Effect of benefits on poor
young women versus
nonpoor young women 1.07 .3839 1.33 .2212 0.94 .4790
Poor young women versus
poor young men 1.21 .2714 1.61 .0798 1.14 .3227
Effect of benefits on poor 
young women versus 
poor young men 0.33 .9529 0.48 .8697 0.39 .9279
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.37
poor young women's responses to differences in welfare benefits are not different from either those of
nonpoor young women or poor young men.  Differences between poor young women and the
comparisons are not due to differential responses to welfare benefit differences.  This inference appears
in all six models reported in Table 6.
To investigate whether differences between groups are significant from a substantive
viewpoint, Tables 7 and 8 report predicted migration rates for the two baseline models.  Table 7 reports
predictions  from the baseline model (left-most column) in Table 4, and Table 8 presents predicted
migration rates for the baseline model in Table 5.  Predicted rates for eight distinct subpopulations are
listed; columns one through four report rates for men, and columns five through eight report rates for
women.  Each table reports four sets of predicted rates and within each set, rates for three distances: 
15, 20, and 25 miles.  These distances approximate the quartiles of the distance distribution and hence
report the response rate for the middle 50 percent of the distance distribution.  In each table the first set
of predicted rates are for intrastate moves.  The second set are for interstate migration rates assuming
no differences in welfare benefits across states.  The last two sets of predicted rates capture the effect
of benefit differences.  Table 7 reports interstate migration rates assuming benefits in the neighboring
state are $50 greater than in the origin location.  Predicted interstate migration in the presence of a $100
difference in benefits is shown in the last block of Table 7.  According to the definitions applied in this
paper, the pull of the welfare magnet should appear in the differences in migration rates of the last
block versus the preceding blocks.  The third block of predicted rates in Table 8 corresponds to
interstate migration into a welfare magnet (ATM=1).  The last block in Table 8 corresponds to interstate
migration rates from a welfare magnet (REM=1).
Predicted migration rates vary only slightly between the two specifications.  Because of this
similarity, except for the discussion of the effect of the benefit variables, I discuss only rates reported in
Table 7.  The difference between rows within a block recovers the effect of distance on migration.38
TABLE 7
Predicted Migration Rates (per 1000), Based on Estimates Reported in Table 4
                        Men                                                 Women                      
        Old                   Young                  Old                  Young       
Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor
Intrastate
15 miles  8.95  8.68  24.13  15.46  8.59  8.50  23.64  21.00
20 miles  6.90  6.69  18.61  11.92  6.62 6.55 18.22  16.19
25 miles  5.32 5.16 14.34 9.19 5.10  5.05  14.05  12.48
Interstate, no difference in welfare benefits
15 miles  3.74  3.63  10.09  6.46  3.59  3.55  9.88  8.78
20 miles  2.88  2.80    7.78  4.98  2.77  2.74  7.61 6.77
25 miles  2.22  2.16    5.99  3.84 2.13 2.11 5.87  5.22
Interstate, difference in welfare benefits = $50
15 miles  3.65  4.11  9.28  6.66  3.41  3.58  9.07  8.52
20 miles  2.81  3.16  7.16  5.13  2.63  2.76  6.99  6.57
25 miles  2.17  2.44  5.52  3.96  2.03  2.13  5.39  5.06
Interstate, difference in welfare benefits = $100
15 miles  3.55  4.65  8.54  6.86  3.24  3.60  8.33  8.27
20 miles  2.74  3.58  6.59  5.29  2.50  2.78  6.42  6.38
25 miles  2.11  2.76  5.08  4.08  1.93  2.14  4.95  4.92
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.39
TABLE 8
Predicted Migration Rates (per 1000), Based on Estimates Reported in Table 5
                        Men                                                 Women                      
        Old                   Young                  Old                  Young       
Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor Nonpoor Poor
Intrastate
15 miles 9.12  8.82  24.60 15.52  8.79  8.67  24.04 21.28 
20 miles 6.95  6.72  18.74 11.83  6.70 6.60 18.31 16.21 
25 miles 5.29 5.12 14.28 9.01 5.10  5.03  13.95 12.35 
Interstate, no difference in welfare benefits
15 miles  3.42  3.31   9.22  5.82  3.30  3.25  9.01  7.98
20 miles  2.60  2.52    7.03 4.43  2.51  2.47  6.87 6.08
25 miles  1.98  1.92    5.35  3.38 1.91 1.89 5.23 4.63
Interstate, flow into magnet (ATM=1)
15 miles  4.63  6.52  11.65  12.10  3.81  4.85  11.74  12.74
20 miles  3.52  4.97  8.88  9.22  2.91  3.69  8.95   9.70
25 miles  2.68  3.78  6.76  7.02  2.21  2.81  6.81   7.39
Interstate, flow from magnet (REM=1)
15 miles  7.23  5.59  21.76  14.10  6.40  6.29 23.43  18.27
20 miles  5.51  4.26  16.58  10.74  4.87  4.78  17.85  13.92
25 miles  4.20  3.24  12.63  8.19  3.71  3.65  13.60  10.60
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.40
Because distance enters the model only as a main effect with no interaction terms, the relative change is
constant in all blocks of the panel.  For example, intrastate migration among poor young women
declines 23 percent (compare the last number of the first and second rows of the first block) as distance
increases from 15 to 20 miles ([16.19/21.0] - 1).  Similarly, increasing the distance by another 5 miles,
from 20 to 25 miles, reduces migration rates by another 23 percent ([12.48/21.00] - 1).  The steep
distance gradient is apparent—migration rates decline by 40 percent as distance increases from 15 to 25
miles.  Even at these short distances with controls for distance present, there is a substantial difference
in migration propensities between intrastate and interstate movement.  Holding distance constant,
interstate migration is about 40 percent the rate of intrastate migration (for any group, compare the first
row of the first block with the first row of the second block).  Relative changes for comparisons
involving age and gender are not uniform but depend on the point of evaluation.  For example, for
intrastate moves nonpoor young women are 2.75 times more likely to migrate than are nonpoor old
women, whereas nonpoor young men are 2.7 times more likely to move than a nonpoor old man and 2
percent more likely to move than a nonpoor young woman.  Among older age groups there is little
difference in migration rates for either gender or income; this is not true among younger age groups. 
Among old men, migration rates of the poor are only 3 percent lower than rates of nonpoor
counterparts; among old women migration rates of the poor are 1 percent lower than nonpoor
counterparts and roughly 2 percent lower than comparable male rates.  Migration rates of poor young
women are much more resilient.  Assuming no difference in welfare benefits, migration rates of poor
young women are only 11 percent lower than those of nonpoor young women, while migration rates of
young poor males are approximately one-third lower than those of their nonpoor counterparts.
Now consider the effects of differences in welfare benefits.  First, note that increasing the
difference in welfare benefits to $100 reduces migration by poor young women by 6 percent, while it
increases the migration rate of poor young men by 6 percent (compare the first row of the second block41
with the first row of the last block).  This pattern is exactly the opposite postulated by the welfare
magnet hypothesis.  Moreover, in the presence of a 100 dollar difference in welfare benefits, migration
rates by nonpoor men and women decline by 15 to 16 percent.  Consequently, the difference in
migration rates declines to 1 percent between poor and nonpoor young women, to 20 percent between
poor and nonpoor young men, and to 21 percent between poor young women and poor young men (with
young women still the more likely to move).
The estimated effect of differences in welfare benefits from the estimates reported in Table 5 is
different and slightly richer.  Here, the asymmetric parameterization of the attractive and retentive
forces of the magnet is useful.  Whereas the db parameterization (estimates reported in Table 4)
captures differences in migration rates for all levels of differences in benefits, the estimates from the
dummy variable model identify the welfare magnet effect only from extreme differences in benefits. 
For interstate moves of 20 miles, the attractive force of the welfare magnet increases migration rates of
poor young women a nonnegligible 60 percent or by roughly 3.5 per thousand (compare the second row
of the second and third blocks of Table 8).  However, the attractive force of the magnet also increases
the migration rates of nonpoor young women by 2 per thousand and of poor young men by 4.75.  Yet
according to the welfare magnet hypothesis the pull should be the strongest on poor young women.
Directional evidence on the retentive force of the magnet is even more damaging to the welfare
magnet hypothesis.  Among poor young women, higher benefits at the initial location increase, indeed
more than double, out-migration rates.  For moves of 20 miles, migration rates of poor young women
increase about 7.8 per thousand.  Yet, this is less than the absolute increase experienced by nonpoor
young women, whose migration rate increases by 11 per thousand in the presence of a retentive
magnet.  Migration rates by poor young men increase 6.3 per thousand, which is nevertheless a larger
percentage increase than that experienced by poor young women (147 percent for men versus 129
percent for women).42
The evidence in favor of the welfare magnet is mixed at best.  Among poor young women
changes in migration rates refute the welfare magnet hypothesis.  The estimated effect of an attractive
magnet is to reduce migration and the estimated effect of a retentive magnet is to increase migration. 
Yet, comparisons relative to the two control groups are more favorable (though still mixed).  The
estimated effect of an attractive magnet reduces migration rates of poor young women less than it does
those of nonpoor young women but more than it does those of poor young men.  Similarly, the increase
in migration rates of poor young women to the retentive magnet is, in absolute terms, less than the
increase for nonpoor young women and more than the change experienced by poor young men.
Since identification of the welfare magnet effects comes from these differences-of-differences
of migration rates between poor young women and the two control groups, it is important to ask if the
estimated effects are statistically significant.  Table 9 reports the test statistics for the difference-of-
differences effects for the two parameterizations of benefits.  The first two rows of Table 9 present
estimates of the effects of welfare magnets using the estimates from Table 4.  The difference-of-
difference estimate of the welfare magnet effect obtained by comparing poor young women with
nonpoor young women is 0.8 per thousand (row 1), while the comparison between poor young women
and poor young men yields -0.7 per thousand (row 2).  Neither of these differences is statistically
significant.  Comparisons using the estimates from Table 5 yield much the same pattern; each
hypothesized effect has one effect which is the correct algebraic sign (according to the welfare magnet
hypothesis) and one which is of the wrong sign.  The attractive force of the welfare magnet is 1.5 per
thousand (row 3) or -1.17 per thousand (row 4).  Similarly, the retentive force of the magnet is either -
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TABLE 9
Comparison of Predicted Migration Rates:  Interstate Migration and Distance Equal to 20 miles
(Based on Estimates Reported in Tables 4 and 5)
Comparison       Difference of Differences Test Statistic P-Value
Estimates from Table 4 (db)
Poor young women versus
nonpoor young women (6.38 - 6.77) - (6.42 - 7.61) = 0.80 .5768 .4478
Poor young women versus
poor young men (6.38 - 6.77) - (5.29 - 4.98) = -0.70 .2485 .6181
Estimates from Table 5: Attractive force (ATM)
Poor young women versus
nonpoor young women (9.70 - 6.08) - (8.95 - 6.87) = 1.54 .4258 .5141
Poor young women versus
poor young men (9.70 - 6.08) - (9.22 - 4.43) = -1.17 .2429 .6222
Estimates from Table 5:  Retentive force (REM)
Poor young women versus
nonpoor young women (13.92 - 6.08) - (17.85 - 6.87) = -3.14 1.0095 .3150
Poor young women versus
poor young men (13.92 - 6.08) - (10.74 - 4.43) = 1.53 .2256 .6348
Note:  Variances of the difference in predicted rates are obtained using the delta method. Let   = exp(xb) i i
denote the predicted rate for the ith group with covariates x and estimated parameters b, b   N( ,  ). The
estimated covariance between predicted rates is:  
The estimated variance of a pairwise comparison is:
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poor young women always yield estimated effects with the correct algebraic sign.  Comparisons
between poor young women and poor young men always produce estimated effects with the incorrect
algebraic sign.  Yet these comparisons are statistically insignificant.  Hence the most favorable
evidence of welfare magnet effects is that the attractive force is 1.5 per thousand and is one-half that of
the retentive force.  To claim that welfare magnets exist requires disregarding the comparisons
involving poor young men and the higher out-migration rates of poor young women from welfare
magnets.  There is no compelling reason to disregard this information.
6.3 Regression Results Using Ratios of Migration Rates
Estimates from the second approach are reported in Tables 10 and 11.  Table 10 contains results
using the difference in welfare benefits to measure the force of welfare magnets, while the effects
reported in Table 11 use the indicator variables ATM and REM.  Both tables report only the estimated
coefficients for the benefit variables.  The top portion of each table includes results using nonpoor
young women as the comparison group, while the bottom portion of the table consists of results using
poor young men as the comparison group.  Within each comparison group, estimates are reported for
several sets of additional covariates.  All specifications include the interstate dummy and control for
distance.  They also include a proxy for the complementary flows.  For example, in the comparison
between poor young women and nonpoor young women the log of the comparable ratio (poor young
men to nonpoor young men) appears as a regressor.  This regressor is included to control for all factors
other than the difference in welfare benefits that affect the migration decisions.  Three sets of
covariates complete the covariate controls.  The first set (dcc) controls for differences in county
characteristics that may affect migration decisions:  the crime rate, the per capita property tax rate,
government expenditures, the number of physicians, the unemployment rate, and the log of the
population.  The last two sets are nine indicator variables for the state of residence in 1975 and a group
of twenty-three indicator variables for the state of residence in 1980.  Covariates are added to45
TABLE 10
Estimated Effects of Benefits Using Pairwise Comparisons of Migration Rates:
Dependent Variable = log(PYF/Comparison Group)
(Poverty Definition Number One)
Poor Young Women versus Nonpoor Young Women (n=1125)
      db |t| RMSE Covariates
-.0020 .285 .7329 isd, dr13
.0004 .056 .7325 isd, dr13, dcc
-2.0e-5 .003 .7346 isd, dr13, dcc, bs
-.0063 .201 .7326 isd, dr13, dcc, bs, fs
Poor Young Women versus Poor Young Men (n=1215)
      db |t| RMSE Covariates
-.0069 .811 .8415 isd, dr23
-.0028 .446 .8419 isd, dr23, dcc
-.0014 .156 .8331 isd, dr23, dcc, bs
-.0213 .523 .8337 isd, dr23, dcc, bs, fs
Source:  Author's calculations based on County to County Migration Flow File from the 1980 census.
Covariate Sets:
isd = covariates include interstate dummy and distance
dr13 = log(rate of poor young men / rate of nonpoor young men)
dr23 = log(rate of nonpoor young women / rate of nonpoor young men)
dcc = difference in six county characteristics: crime rate, per capita property tax, per capita
government expenditures, number of physicians, unemployment rate, and log population
 bs = set of 9 indicator variables for state of residence in 1975
  fs = set of 23 indicator variables for state of residence in 198046
TABLE 11
Estimated Effect of Benefits Using Pairwise Comparisons of Migration Rates:
Dependent Variable = log(PYF/Comparison Group)
(Poverty Definition Number One)
Poor Young Women versus Nonpoor Young Women (n=1125)
   ATM |t| REM |t| RMSE     Covariates
-.1269 .775 -.1585 1.292 .7328 isd, dr13
-.1086 .646 -.1868 1.509 .7322 isd, dr23, dcc
-.1162 .685 -.2385 1.773 .7342 isd, dr23, dcc, bs
.0374 .083 -.1820 .437 .7332 isd, dr23, dcc, bs, fs
Poor Young Women versus Poor Young Men (n=1217)
  ATM |t| REM |t| RMSE     Covariates
-.1610 .874 .1364 .764 .8415 isd, dr23
-.1354 .725 .1142 .178 .8419 isd, dr23, dcc
-.1384 .724 .0418 .227 .8333 isd, dr23, dcc, bs
-.1153 .303 .0636 .164 .8343 isd, dr23, dcc, bs, fs
Covariate Sets:
isd = covariates include interstate dummy and distance
dr13 = log(rate of poor young men / rate of nonpoor young men)
dr23 = log(rate of nonpoor young women / rate of nonpoor young men)
dcc = difference in six county characteristics: crime rate, per capita property tax, per capita
government expenditures, number of physicians, unemployment rate, and log population
bs = set of 9 indicator variables for state of residence in 1975
fs = set of 23 indicator variables for state of residence in 198047
see the robustness to an expanding set of controls, attempting to control for other reasons why
individuals migrate.
The results in Tables 10 and 11 reveal that welfare benefits exert no discernable influence on
migration decisions of poor young women.  In Table 10, the estimated coefficients of the difference in
welfare benefits are usually negative, though the estimated effects are extremely small and not even
remotely statistically significant at conventional test levels.  The results in Table 11 are not much
different.  When nonpoor young women are used as the comparison group, the estimated coefficient on
REM (the indicator variable equal to one if the individual lived in a high-benefit state in 1975) is
negative (as it should be because of the retentive force of the magnet).  The estimated coefficients are
not significant at conventional test levels.  However, even this modest result disappears when poor
young men are used as the comparison, as the estimated coefficient on REM is positive, though again
with little precision in the estimated results.  Across both comparison groups, the estimated coefficient
on ATM is usually negative though not precisely determined.  These results imply that high-benefit
states do not "pull" residents in contiguous states toward them.
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Although a finer partition of individuals at risk may yield conflicting results, the evidence from
the aggregate flows of the County to County Migration Files strongly implies that state differences in
combined Food Stamp and AFDC benefits have no influence on interstate migration flows.
7. CONCLUSION
The basic premise of this paper is that an alternative look at welfare magnets focusing on
short-distance migration patterns provides a new perspective on this long-standing policy issue.  
Analyzing all interstate migratory flows between contiguous states yields a much richer behavioral
picture than obtained from the conventional review of only flows into prospective magnets.  The data
offer no compelling evidence in support of the welfare magnet hypothesis.  Migration propensities are48
as likely to invalidate as they are to support the welfare magnet hypothesis.  Moreover, none of the
estimated effects of welfare benefits are statistically significant at conventional levels.  Comparing
migration rates of poor young women with those of nonpoor young women yields estimated effects
most favorable to the welfare magnet hypothesis (but the estimated effects are not statistically
different).  By these measures, the attractive force of the magnet is 1.5 per thousand and the retentive
force is 3 per thousand.  Taken at face value, these two rates can be used to rationalize the findings of
Peterson and Rom (1990), who used differences in the proportion in poverty to recover estimates of
welfare magnets.  My estimates suggest that increasing poverty and the retention of the currently poor
may have driven Peterson and Rom's results.
Nevertheless, to accept these (statistically insignificant) favorable estimates requires that one
disregard several conflicting estimates obtained from comparing poor young men and poor young
women.  Most importantly, if one accepts the favorable estimates, one must disregard the finding that
an increase in current-location benefits increases out-migration rates.  There is no compelling reason to
disregard this finding.
The interpretation best supported by the data is that estimated effects of differences in welfare
benefits across states have no substantive or statistically significant effect.  The longevity of this issue
in public debates owes more to voter perceptions than to migration flows observable in the census.  The
interesting question that remains for future work is to investigate the consequences of migration for
low-income individuals and for locations sending and receiving them.49
      The single largest movement of blacks occurred during World War I, as 500,000 moved from the
1
rural South to the urban North and Midwest.  The migration continued steadily until the early 1970s;
from 1916 to 1970 more than six million blacks moved.  During the 1970s and 1980s the pattern of
migration reversed as more blacks moved to the South than left (Long 1988; Lichter and De Jong
1990).  It is important to realize the mass exodus started long before the expansion of welfare programs
in the mid- to late 1960s.  Until 1969, states set residency requirements as a condition of eligibility for
public assistance, so many more people migrated than were eligible for welfare programs. 
      See Glazer's (1987) insightful review of this literature as well.
2
      In the absence of moving costs there must be a negative relationship between income and amenity
3
levels for both locations to be inhabited.
      The other major program, Medicaid, varies significantly across states though most of the variation
4
(e.g., coverage of nursing home expenses) has a greater impact on older individuals and should have
little effect on younger individuals.
      All benefits are denominated in constant 1980 dollars.  I use the Consumer Price Index for Food to
5
convert Food Stamp benefits and the CPI to convert AFDC benefits into constant dollars.
      The similarity of benefits across states is an interesting observation in its own right, which will not
6
be pursued here, but see Orr (1976).  The narrowing of the dispersion of state benefits may reflect a
legislative response to welfare migration or perceived welfare migration.  It may be good politics for a
rational legislator to vote to reduce state welfare benefits if constituents believe their state is a magnet
whether or not this belief is correct.












      I thank Kate Dresher for providing me with an extract of the City and County Code Book.
7
      Great Circle distances recognize the spherical nature of the earth.  Let (x,y) denote the latitude and
8
i i
longitude of location i=1,2, and   the angle between the two locations,
, and distance equals   (69.16 miles
per degree).
      Future analyses of individual longitudinal data (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth) will
9
estimate the size of the bias from this limitation. 
      Random variable X is a member of the linear exponential family if its density can be written as
10
f(x, ) = exp{A( ) + B(x) + C( ) x} with parameter  .  See Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon
(1984a). 
      The robust estimator of the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is
11
.      
      See Cameron and Trivedi (1990) as well.  
12
      This parameterization is subsumed in equation (7).  If Y is a counting random variable with
13
expectation  (x), then with multiplicative errors Y= (x) , with E( )=1.  
      In cases when both the numerator and denominator are zero, I define the ratio as equal to one. 
14
Otherwise when the denominator is zero and the numerator is nonzero, the ratio is undefined; such
county-to-county flows are excluded from the analysis.
      Several other specifications were estimated, including models with only some or no interaction
15
terms, models with indicator variables for state of origin and destination, and models with controls for
the population at risk.  These models exhibited the same qualitative pattern of estimated coefficients as
reported in Tables 4 and 5.
      I thank Kate Dresher for bringing this problem to my attention.
16
      Moreover, calculations available from the author show that the results are robust to the sample
1751
definition and the definition of "poor."5253
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